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Abstract
Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. In contrast
to domestic voice call prices, entry of new rms does not put a down-
ward wholesale and retail price pressure on mobile usage abroad. The
network connection switches frequently between available networks, and
the choice of network has largely been independent of wholesale prices. As
a consequence, the wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent
European price cap regulation does not solve this underlying problem, and
there may be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have
for domestic call termination. This should be a cautionary tale to the
authorities whose goal is that the price cap regulation should be tempo-
rary. We show that there is also a risk that wholesale price cap regulation
stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.
1 Introduction
As soon as your plane arrives abroad, the charges you face for mobile phone
usage become sky-high. Entry of new mobile network providers has been con-
sidered as one of the key explanations of the reduction in domestic mobile call
charges since the mid 90s. In sharp contrast to this, voice call prices when
travelling abroad have not been reduced. In fact, the European Commission
(2000) found that mobile phone usage abroad became more expensive during
the period from 1997 to 2000.
When consumers use their mobile phones abroad their domestic mobile
provider acts as a downstream rm and the foreign network as an upstream
rm. The high retail charges are at least partly resulting from high whole-
sale prices (roaming prices). While collusive behavior and unilateral facilitating
We thank Hans Jarle Kind for useful comments. The views of the authors are not neces-
sarily those of Telenor.
yTelenor R&I, Norway. E-mail: terje.ambjornsen@telenor.com
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practices have been used as explanations for high prices, the core problem may
be the technological structure for how network selection among available net-
works in the visited country has been designed. A key technological feature
of the wholesale market is random choice of network in the visited country in
the sense that the probability that a given network is chosen is independent
of wholesale prices. As consumers observe when arriving abroad, network con-
nection switches frequently between di¤erent available networks during a stay
abroad. As a consequence, consumers will typically neither have complete in-
formation on which network they are connected to nor on corresponding retail
prices. Thus, they will typically base their consumption on the average retail
price, labeled customer ignorance (see Gans and King, 2000, and Wright, 2002).
Since the late 90s policy makers have raised concerns about the high retail
and wholesale prices on mobile usage when traveling abroad, and a European
regulation on retail and wholesale prices came into force in June 2007 (European
Union, 2007). The EU regulation imposes price caps both at the retail and the
wholesale level, but does not intend to solve the underlying problem (the way
network selection is structured).
Analogous to previous ndings, we show that the idiosyncratic features de-
scribed above give rise to the result that unregulated wholesale prices increase
in the number of upstream rms.1 An upstream rm knows that its whole-
sale price does not a¤ect the probability of its network being chosen, and an
increase in the wholesale price will only a¤ect demand through the change in
the average price. This is consistent with the abovementioned observations that
roaming charges have not been reduced as more rms have entered the market.
While the wholesale price caps imposed in EU may obviously reduce the
rmsabilities to increase wholesale prices, the regulation does not reduce rms
incentives to increase wholesale prices. In fact, we show that the imposed whole-
sale price cap may increase unconstrained wholesale prices. When the probabil-
ity that a given network is chosen is independent of wholesale prices (random
network selection), wholesale prices become strategic substitutes. A wholesale
price cap that is binding for a fraction of the upstream rms, will therefore
induce unconstrained upstream rms to increase their wholesale charges.
Wholesale price-cap regulation may also give upstream rms incentives to in-
volve in wasteful rent-seeking activities, e.g. excessive capacity investments. We
show that a binding price-cap regulation may induce upstream rms to engage
in rent-seeking activities à là a Tullock (1980) contest. In our stylized model
there are no incentives for rent-seeking investments without regulation. When a
binding wholesale price-cap regulation is imposed, there will be a positive shift in
the upstream rmsrent-seeking incentives. Since customer ignorance and ran-
dom network selection lead to wholesale price levels beyond monopoly pricing,
rms will prot from price-cap regulations that move wholesale price levels to-
wards the monopoly price. On the other hand, when the total roaming revenue
pie increases, rent seeking will increase, explaining why rent seeking is nega-
1See Ambjørnsen and Wasenden (2005) and Lupi and Manenti (2008). This result resem-
bles Gans and King (2000), who analyze customer ignorance in the market for mobile call
termination (see also discussion below).
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tively correlated with price cap levels beyond the monopoly price. Therefore,
for higher price-cap levels the degree of rent seeking may in fact be stimulated
as wholesale prices are regulated down.
New technology has improved the ability to steer tra¢ c to preferred net-
works, and thereby make network selection dependent on wholesale prices. An
industry-wide adoption of such technology may obviously alter the outcome,
and wholesale prices will probably become strategic complements.2 However,
consumers still experience that network connection switches frequently between
di¤erent available networks, and it is still reasonable to assume that at least a
signicant portion of the consumers base their demand on the average price from
available networks. This should also be taken into account when evaluating the
European price-cap regulation, and, for the sake of the argument, we continue
to assume that network selection is independent of wholesale prices when we
scrutinize the current price-cap regulation.
The consumers may also endogenously select which network to connect to
abroad (labeled manual network selection). If the downstream rm sets retail
prices that depend on which network the consumer is connected to in the visited
country, this may obviously give the consumers an incentive for manual selection
of preferred networks. In an environment where consumers manually select
network connection, the outcome will be signicantly altered. Analogous to
tra¢ c-steering by downstream rms to one preferred network, manual network
selection by the consumers will probably turn wholesale prices into strategic
complements. However, the majority of consumers do not use this opportunity
(Oftel, 2002), and if the price-cap regulation has reduced price variations, this
will further reduce consumersincentives for manual network selection.
The European price-cap regulation has up to now had a striking impact on
the retail price structure. Prior to the EU regulation the majority of rms were
o¤ering di¤erentiated retail prices, depending on which network the consumers
were connected to in the visited country. In July 2008, however, about a year
after the EU regulation was implemented, the majority of rms within EU were
o¤ering uniform retail price structures. Each rm now o¤ers a uniform retail
price independent of which network consumers are connected to in the visiting
country. Moreover, the retail price o¤ered by a given retailer is uniform across
countries within the EU region, and this will further increase upstream rms
incentives to raise unconstrained wholesale prices. This is in sharp contrast to
the rather common di¤erentiated pricing strategy before the regulation was im-
plemented. Retail price variations have thus been signicantly reduced after the
implementation of the EU regulation, and we show that reduced price variations
both at the retail and the wholesale level are consistent with the predictions of
our model.
Why roaming charges have not been reduced in the same way as domestic
2The reason is that downstream rms may set upstream roaming providers up against
each other, and consumers will have more accurate information about which network they are
connected to. Wholesale and retail roaming prices will be driven downwards. This is shown by
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), who discuss international roaming within a two-country duopoly
setting.
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call prices as more rms have entered the market, has been discussed informally
by policy makers as well as by economists (European Commission, 2000, Euro-
pean Regulatory Group, 2005, Oftel, 2002, Sutherland, 2001, and Valletti, 2004,
among others). Formal analyses on the topic are important, however, in order
to evaluate the new regulatory obligations imposed in Europe.
Given the huge attention towards roaming prices there are, to our knowledge,
surprisingly few formal analyses on the wholesale roaming markets. Valletti
(2003) analyses the incentives for domestic roaming where an operator wants
roaming rights on a domestic rivals network. Salsas and Koboldt (2004) analyze
wholesale international roaming within a duopoly framework in two countries.
Their main focus is on the e¤ects of the ability to redirect roaming tra¢ c and
e¤ects of cross-border mergers. Given their assumption of duopoly their model
is not designed to analyze pricing in an oligopoly setting. Furthermore, they
do not analyze whether possible e¤ects of the recent EU regulation of interna-
tional roaming. Lupi and Manenti (2008) too focus also on the role of tra¢ c
management and e¢ ciency, also mainly in a two-country two-operator setting.
In contrast to their paper we focus on the impact on retail and wholesale price
structures from price-cap regulations and rent-seeking behavior.
Domestic mobile consumers may also base their demand on average prices.
The reason is that consumers are often not able to identify which network they
are calling, and the consumers are consequently often ignorant about the price
they actually have to pay when prices di¤er between di¤erent networks. As
a consequence, the providers may have incentives to raise their wholesale call
termination charges (Gans and King, 2000 and Wright, 2002).3 For domestic
mobile telephony this negative price externality partly arises due to number
portability (see Bühler and Haucap, 2004). This accentuates the fact that as
long as the authorities do not solve the underlying problem there may be a
permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call
termination.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we discuss the recent European price-cap regulation. Finally, in section
4 we conclude.
2 The model
We set up a simple model with two domestic downstream rms and n foreign
upstream rms, and we consider the following three-stage game: At stage 1 each
of the n upstream rms makes an investment in rent-seeking technology Ij ,
where j 2 f1; :::; ng. When upstream rms invest into rent-seeking technology
the marginal investment cost is c > 0. At stage 2 each of the n upstream rms
3See Salop and Stiglitz (1977) for a more general framework where a fraction of consumers
base their demand on average prices.
4Gans and King (2000) show that an increase in the number of mobile operators may
increase domestic xed-to-mobile charges. Gans, King and Wright (2006) provide a compre-
hensive overview of the literature on the economics of mobile communications.
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sets its wholesale price wj . We thus assume that both downstream rms are
o¤ered the same wholesale price from rm j.5 Furthermore, we assume that both
downstream rms buy the wholesale service from all n upstream rms. At stage
3 the two downstream rms simultaneously set retail prices pij , where i 2 f1; 2g
and j 2 f1; ::; ng. Note that rm i may charge end-user prices dependent on
which upstream rm the consumer is connected to.
We make two assumptions that reect some idiosyncratic features of the case
at hand:
Assumption 1: Network selection independent of wholesale charges:
The probability j that a visitor is connected to upstream rm js network is
independent of wj ; where j > 0, and nj=1j = 1.
Assumption 2: Customer ignorance: The consumers only take the
average price, pi = 
n
j=1jpij , into account.
The probability j that a visitor is connected to upstream rm j is
j =
I0j +Ij
j
 
I0j +Ij
 = I0j +Ij
I
; where I = j
 
I0j +Ij

; (1)
where I0j is the level of quality enhancing investments, and is determined
outside the model. One interpretation is that I0j is the investment in general
network quality and coverage (towards domestic end-users and foreign visitors),
and that this decision is taken before the decision on rent-seeking technology.
As described above, Ij is a rent-seeking investment made by upstream rm
j at stage 1. The probability of being selected is typically endogenous since
operators may improve this probability through network investments beyond the
capacity level needed to serve consumers. For instance, investments in capacity
and coverage at e.g. airports enhances the probability of being selected when
roaming end-users enter a country. Furthermore, improving indoor coverage,
e.g. in hotels, to avoid that a visiting end-user switches to a competing network
- due to loss of signal strength - may also be a way to increase a companys
roaming market share.
The formulation in equation (1) is analogous to what has often been used in
the contest literature, following the seminal work of Tullock (1980). In a Tullock
(1980) contest the players compete for a prize by making a sunk investment of
some kind.6
5Historically operators applied uniform wholesale pricing. In fact, non-discrimination was
part of the standard roaming framework provided by the GSM Association (see e.g. Salsas and
Koboldt, 2004, Sutherland, 2001, Valetti, 2004). More recently, operator specic discounts
have become more common.
6Konrad (2007) provides a comprehensive survey of the contest literature and many contest
type applications. A similar investment structure is also used in the literature on semicollusion,
where rms typically collude on prices (stage 2) and compete in e.g. capacities (stage1); see
e.g. Fershtman and Gandal (1994) and Steen and Sørgard (1999). An investment in e.g
5
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As discussed in the Introduction, Assumption 2 may be seen as a conse-
quence of Assumption 1; customer ignorance follows from the fact that network
conncetion frequently switches between available upstream networks. From As-
sumption 1 it follows that both downstream rms face the following average
wholesale price:
w =
nP
j=1
jwj (2)
To rule out the possibility that collusion and/or unilateral strategic e¤ects
drive the results, we assume that there is perfect competition in the down-
stream market.7 The assumption of perfect retail competition is not a realistic
description of the market at hand. We make this assumption for the sake of
the argument however and in order to focus on the e¤ects from the features
described in Assumptions 1 and 2.8 The demand of downstream rm i is then
given by
Di
 
pi; p i

=
8<: A  pi if pi < p i(A  pi) =2 if pi = p i
0 if pi > p i
(3)
where A = a+jI0j . Hence, for the sake of the argument we have assumed
that @A=@Ij = 0, such that Ij is purely wasteful rent-seeking. The game
may now be solved by standard backward induction. First, we analyze the
outcome without price-cap regulation. Second, we we analyze the e¤ects of
wholesale price cap-regulation.
2.1 Without price-cap regulation
Stage 3. Since both downstream rms face the same average wholesale price
(2), it follows that at stage 2 the average retail price is
pi = w (4)
Note that it is the average price that is important. Downstream rms have
the exibility to set some prices, pij , which deviate from w as long as the average
price is competitive. At stage 3 the price vector o¤ered by rm i is then given
by:
pi = (pi1; :::; pin) such that pi = 
n
j=1jpij = w (5)
Consequently, the downstream rms may implement a uniform retail price
pi, where pi1 = ::: = pin = w, without losing competitive strength. However,
excessive capacity at stage 1 then increases the share of the pie (the cartel prot) at stage
2. The similarities with the contest literature are, to our knowledge, not emphasized in the
literature on semicollusion.
7This is the reason why we assume that there are just two downstream rms. Increasing
the number of downstream rms above two will not change the results.
8Alternatively we may have assumed a retail monopoly.
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a price vector pi = (pi1 7 ::: 7 pin) will also be an equilibrium as long as
(5) is fullled. We may for instance have that some retailers provide a price
vector where pij is increasing in wj . The model is thus consistent with the
market observations that some retailers provide a uniform retail price, while
other retailers provide a price structure where retail prices depend on which
network the customer is connected to in the visiting country (see below).
Stage 2. The aggregate demand is given by
D (w) = A  w (6)
At stage 2 upstream rm j faces the following demand (we assume that one
unit of the upstream good is needed to produce the nal service):
Dj (w;j) = j (A  w) (7)
At stage 2 upstream rm j solves the following maximization problem:
max
wj
j = wjj (A  w)  cIj (8)
The rst-order conditions of the upstream rm j 2 f1; :::; ng become9
(A  w)  wjj = 0 (9)
By adding up the n rst order conditions we nd the weighted average
wholesale price
w =
nA
n+ 1
(10)
By inserting (10) into (9) the wholesale price charged by rm j becomes:
wj =
1
j
A
n+ 1
for j 2 f1; :::; ng (11)
Stage 1. By inserting (10) and (11) into (8) we nd that upstream rm js
prot is given by
j =
A
(n+ 1)
2   cjIj (12)
.
From (12) the following result follows:
Proposition 1 With customer ignorance and no wholesale price-cap regulation
there will be no investments in rent-seeking technology.
9Second-order condititions are fulllled.
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This reects the fact that larger investments and higher probability of be-
ing selected fully are counteracted by lower wholesale prices (wj decreases in
j). It is then straightforward to see that rent-seeking investments Ij are not
protable. Roughly speaking, increasing the wholesale price is an alternative
way for opportunistic ("rent-seeking") behavior. Note that this outcome may
depend on the assumption that j > 0 for all j, and that the downstream rms
have a wholesale contract with all j. We do this to highlight the di¤erences
from the case with price-cap regulation analyzed below.
Furthermore, from (10) and (11) we have
Proposition 2 With customer ignorance and no price-cap regulation:
(i) The prot of upstream rm j is decreasing in the number of upstream
rms n,
(ii) The weighted average wholesale price w is increasing in the number of
upstream rms n and independent of the distribution of j,
(iii) The wholesale price of rm j; wj ; is decreasing in the number of up-
stream rms n and decreasing in rm js market share j.
The results in Proposition 2 correspond to previous ndings in the pres-
ence of customer ignorance and wholesale pricing (Gans and King, 2000, Amb-
jørnsen and Wasenden, 2005, and Lupi and Manenti, 2008). The reason why the
weighted average wholesale price exceeds the monopoly wholesale price reects
the structure of the demand side. In particular, since a marginal increase in
wj by rm j increases the average wholesale price w only by a factor j , the
elasticity of demand, from rm js perspective, may be very low. Given our
assumption of perfect competition among the downstream rms, an increase in
w is passed on to consumers in a 1:1 relationship. More generally, also under
imperfect competition, and with more reasonable assumptions, we have that an
increase in w will increase retail prices. A prediction that follows from Propo-
sition 2 is that the average retail price is increasing in the number of upstream
rms. In practice, the upstream rms are present in their domestic retail mar-
kets. When more rms enter the domestic retail market, this will at the same
time increase the number of upstream rms in the wholesale roaming market.
Fierce competition for domestic voice calls (a high n) will then increase roaming
wholesale and retail prices. As mentioned in the Introduction, this is consis-
tent with the ndings by the European Commission (2000) in a sector inquiry
into international roaming charges. The inquiry used data from 1997 to 2000,
and one of the main ndings was that during this period wholesale roaming
prices (and consequently retail roaming prices) increased. In the same period,
the number of mobile operators increased and domestic mobile charges were
signicantly reduced.
2.2 With wholesale price-cap regulation
A key feature of the new European regulation that came into force from June
2007 is a price cap both on retail and wholesale charges. Let us now assume
8
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that a wholesale price-cap regulation is imposed, but the retail prices are still
unregulated. The wholesale price cap species a maximum average per-minute
wholesale charge, and applies for all providers of wholesale roaming services.
In the current model the European wholesale price cap may be interpreted as
wj  bw for all j 2 f1; ::; ng where bw is the price cap. The price-cap regulation
is imposed prior to the game analyzed above.
Stage 3 is then still given by equation (5).
Stage 2: Without loss of generality we assume that 1 > 1  2  :::: 
n > 0, such that without regulation of wholesale prices it follows from (11)
that w1  w2  ::::  wn. If wn  bw, we have a non-binding price cap for all
upstream rms j 2 f1; ::; ng, while the price cap is binding for all j 2 f1; ::; ng if
w1  bw. In an intermediate case where wm < bw  wm+1, wherem  1, the price
cap bw is binding for j 2 fm+1; ::; ng but is not binding for j 2 f1; ::;mg. In the
latter case, the rmsm+1 through n are forced to reduce their wholesale charges
when the price cap is enforced. The question is now: How will unconstrained
rms 1 through m react?
From the rst-order conditions given by (9) we nd the reaction functions:
wj =
A  P
m6=j
mwm
2j
(13)
From the upstream rmsreaction functions (13) we have that:
Proposition 3 The wholesale prices are strategic substitutes.
A Corollary which follows from Proposition 3 is:
Corollary 1: If the wholesale price cap bw is binding only for a fraction of
the upstream rms j 2 fm+ 1; ::; ng, where m  1 (i.e. the wholesale prices of
rm j 2 fm+1; ::; ng are regulated down), the unconstrained rms j 2 f1; ::;mg
will increase their wholesale prices when bw is enforced.
Proof. See the Appendix
Put di¤erently, the degree of wholesale price variations will be lower with
than without a wholesale price-cap regulation as now implemented in the EU.
Due to the feature of random network selection, the wholesale prices become
strategic substitutes. The reduction in the average wholesale price from a whole-
sale price cap will partly be countered by the fact that unconstrained upstream
providers will increase their wholesale prices (the weigthed average wholesale
price will decrease, though).
Stage 1: For simplicity, we now assume I0j = I
0 for all j, such that j = 1=n
as long as the upstream rms do not invest in rent-seeking technology. We
9
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concentrate on the case where the price cap is binding. Then the prot for rm
j may be written as
j = w^ (A  w^) I
0 +Ij
I
  cIj : (14)
Recall from (12) that in the unregulated case, the rst part of the prot
function is independent of Ij , such that there will be no rent-seeking invest-
ments. In contrast to the unregulated case, the rst part of the prot function
(14) is dependent on Ij . When the price cap is binding for all j, the regulation
gives rise to a contest a la Tullock (1980).
In an interior equilibrium solution, Ij is determined by10
@j
@Ij
=
I  Ij   I0
I2
w^ (A  w^)  c = 0, j 2 f1; ::; ng: (15)
In a symmetric equilibrium, where Ij = I for all j, the set of rst-order
condititions can be rewritten as
(n  1)
n (I0 +I)
w^ (A  w^)
n
  c = 0 (16)
The equilibrium level of rent-seeking investment, Ij ; can now be found
from (16)
I =
w^ (A  w^)
n
n  1
cn
  I0, for all j: (17)
The condititon that ensures rent-seeking is
I > 0 if
w^ (A  w^)
n
n  1
n
> cI0
Proposition 4 Assume that I0j = I
0 for all j and that the wholesale price-cap
regulation is binding(w^  nAn+1):
(i) There will be investments in rent-seeking technolgy (I > 0 for all j) as
long as w^(A w^)n
n 1
n > cI
0.
(ii) I(w^) is inverted U-shaped with a maximum at w^ = A=2 (the monopoly
price).
The price cap is binding when w^ = nAn+1 . Then rent-seeking investment in-
centives make a positive shift. This reects the fact that an increase in the
probability of being the chosen network will not a¤ect wholesale prices neg-
atively. Network investment may now be used as a rent-seeking instrument.
10When w^ is su¢ ciently close to A or 0, an interior solution does not exist, i.e. Ij = 0:
10
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As long as w^ binds, and I  0, I is a bell-shaped function of w^. The
rent-seeking investment reaches its maximum level when the monopoly price is
achieved (w^ = A=2).
When w^ > A=2, rent-seeking investments increase as w^ decreases towards
A=2. To see why, note that w^ (A  w^) reects total roaming revenues in the
market. When w^ > A=2 total roaming revenues increase when w^ decreases.
The larger "pie" stimulates rent-seeking activity. In contrast, when w^ < A=2;
rent-seeking investments decrease as w^ decreases. In this case total roaming
revenues decrease as w^ is lowered.
This resembles a Tullock (1980) contest where the players compete for a
price, and the rent-seeking investments increase the higher the prize is. The
welfare implications of a price-cap regulation are therefore ambiguous. When
w^ is lowered, prices are reduced. However, when w^ 2
h
A
2 ;
nA
(n+1)
i
, rent seeking
investments are higher the lower w^. Below this level, both average retail prices
and rent-seeking investments are reduced when w^ is lowered, and from (17) it
follows that there will be no rent-seeking when w^ is close to zero (the marginal
costs).
3 The European price-cap regulation on mobile
roaming
As long as the national regulatory authorities care more about domestic con-
sumer surplus and prots than about the negative impact of higher roaming
prices, higher prices for international roaming may be seen as an externality
from increased domestic retail competition. This may explain why a supra-
national regulatory approach is now initiated by the EU. The European Union
(2007) states that [The 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communica-
tions] has not provided national regulatory authorities with su¢ cient tools to
take e¤ective and decisive action with regard to the pricing of roaming ser-
vices.....This Regulation is an appropriate means of correcting this situation.
However, as shown in the previous section, while the European wholesale price-
cap regulation by its very nature may reduce upstream rmsabilities to increase
wholesale prices, the regulation may at the same time increase their incentives
to raise wholesale prices. Furthermore, a binding wholesale price regulation may
induce rent-seeking investments in order to capture a larger share of the total
"pie".
We have limited our analysis to wholesale price-cap regulation. The next
question is how a reduction in the wholesale price variation will transform into
retail prices. From the above we know that the downstream rms may im-
plement a uniform retail price, pi, where pi1 = ::: = pin , or a price vector
pi = (pi1 7 ::: 7 pin), as long as (5) is fullled. If downstream rm i provides a
price vector where pij is increasing in wj ( @pij=@wj > 0) and wholesale price
changes partly or fully are passed on to end users, a binding wholesale price
11
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cap bw will also transform into lower retail price variations. If wm < bw  wm+1,
where m  1, the downstream rm i will reduce pij for j 2 fm+1; ::; ng (whole-
sale price reductions due to the binding cap are passed on to end users) and
increase pij for j 2 f1; ::;mg (reect wholesale price increases of unconstrained
upstream rms).
In addition to the wholesale price cap, the European regulation enforces a
retail price cap on a call level such that pij  bp for all i 2 f1; 2g and j 2
f1; :::; ng. Assume now that the retail price cap is binding; such that bp = w.
We immediately see that the equilibrium average price pi = w = bp, can only be
realized through uniform retail pricing. A price vector pi where pij is increasing
(or decreasing) in wj , subject to the condition that pi = w = bp, would imply
that some retail prices would violate the retail price -cap regulation.
Both wholesale and retail price-cap regulation may thus reduce retail price
variations, and Corollary 2 follows from the above results:
Corollary 2: The European wholesale and retail price-cap regulation may
induce downstream rms to introduce uniform retail pricing; i.e. pij = pi for
all j 2 f1; ::; ng.
Therefore, when more downstream rms introduce uniform pricing as a re-
sponse to the implementation of price caps, we expect to see that downstream
rm i will increase retail prices which prior to the regulation were set below the
retail price cap (i.e. where pij < bp prior to the regulation).
While wholesale prices are not publicly available, retail prices are. The Eu-
ropean Commission (2008) compares retail prices in all EU retail markets before
(March 2007) and after (July 2008) the price-cap regulation was enforced.11 For
each retail market (country) the European Commission (2008) has collected re-
tail prices for consumers who are visiting six di¤erent EU countries (wholesale
markets). There are a few exceptions, but, generally, the retail price cap was
binding for most retail prices prior to the regulation. The possibility to test
whether below-the-price-cap retail prices were in fact increased after the regu-
lation was implemented is therefore limited. In the few cases where the retail
price cap was non-binding, the majority of operators chose to increase retail
prices.
In the table below we show evidence of a striking change towards uniform
retail pricing as a response to the introduction of price cap regulation. In
column 2 we have the number of retailers, and in column 3 the number of
retailers using uniform retail pricing where prices are independent of which
network the consumers are connected to in the visited country prior to the
regulation. Generally, the picture is mixed. Some retailers use uniform pricing,
while others use network dependent retail prices. France, Italy and Spain are the
only retail markets where all retailers use uniform pricing prior to the regulation.
11Retail price information is also available for September 2007, soon after the regulation
was implemented. We believe, however, that the July 2008 data are more representative for
a more long term perspective. Data after July 2008 are currently not availbale.
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In contrast, in July 2008 a majority of all providers in EU retail markets use
uniform prices (column 4).
As illustrated in the table (column 5), the EU price-cap regulation seems to
have induced many retail rms to switch to a practice with one uniform retail
price for all countries in the EU-region; "EU zone tari¤". We now investigate
how such an "EU zone tari¤" will a¤ect upstream rms pricing incentives.
In order to do so we use the same model structure as above, except that we
assume that there are M di¤erent upstream markets (i.e. countries). Within
each upstream market there are n upstream rms.
Assumption 1 implies that the probability that upstream rm j in country k
is used is kj ; where 
k
j > 0, and 
n
j=1
k
j = 1 for k 2 f1; :::;Mg. The probability
that a consumer travels in country k, where k 2 f1; :::;Mg, is k; where k > 0
and ck=1
k = 1.
We now add the restriction to the maximization problem that the retail price
is uniform for all M . As we argued above, with random network selection it
is reasonable to assume that the consumers only take the average retail price
in the visited country into account. A uniform retail roaming price for a given
foreign country is then an equilibrium. However, consumers obviously know
which country they travel to, and consequently it is not reasonable to assume
that they base their consumption on the average retail price for several countries
if there are di¤erences in the retail roaming prices between countries (markets).
Hence, it may not be an equilibrium to o¤er a uniform price for several countries.
From the system of rst-order conditions we nd the wholesale price charged
by rm j in market k
wkj =
1
kkj
A
Mn+ 1
;
and the weighted average wholesale price now becomes
w =
AMn
Mn+ 1
:
We then have the result that uniform retail pricing used for several coun-
tries ("zone pricing") will, all other things equal, increase the weighted average
wholesale price, w.
The intuition is analogous to the basic model; the higher the number of
upstream rms within a "zone" (Mn), the smaller the e¤ect of a price increase
will be on demand and the higher wholesale prices will be. Thus, all other things
equal, the introduction of "zone pricing" tends to further increase the incentives
to set high voice call charges abroad. Again we see that while the European
price-cap regulation by its very nature may reduce rmsabilities to increase
retail and wholesale prices, the regulation may at the same time increase rms
incentives to raise prices. This should be a cautionary tale to the authorities
whose goal is that the regulatory remedies should be temporary.
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Retail market Number of
retailers (which
reported retail
roaming charges
March 2007)*
Number of
retailers using
uniform retail
pricing March
2007**
Number of
retailers using
uniform retail
pricing July 2008
Number of retailers
using “zone pricing”
for all destination
countries July
2008***
Austria 2 1 1 1
Belgium 3 1 3 0
Bulgaria 2 0 2 2
Cyprus 2 0 2 1
Czech Republic 2 0 2 2
Denmark 5 3 2 2
Estonia 3 0 3 3
Finland 4 0 4 3
France 3 3 3 3
Germany 4 1 4 4
Greece 3 1 3 1
Hungary 3 2 3 3
Ireland 4 0 4 1
Italy 3 3 3 3
Latvia 3 0 2 2
Lithuania 3 0 2 2
Luxemburg 2 0 2 1
Malta 2 0 2 2
Netherlands 4 0 4 4
Poland 4 1 4 4
Portugal 3 1 3 3
Romania 3 2 3 3
Slovakia 2 0 2 2
Slovenia 2 0 2 2
Spain 3 2 3 3
Sweden 4 0 4 4
United Kingdom 5 3 5 5
Total 83 24 77 66
***I.e. the retailer has the same uniform retail price in all six destination countries we have data from.
March 2007 July 2008
*In several countries more retail operators are present in the market in March 2007, but we only report
the number of retailers which have reported prices both in March 2007 and July 2007.
**Uniform pricing implies that a retailer offers one price regardless of which network (wholesaler) the
customer is connected to in the destination country when calling home.
Figure 1: Retail price structure
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4 Concluding remarks
Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive and the prices have not
been reduced as more rms have entered the market. While collusive behav-
ior and unilateral facilitating practices have been used as explanations for high
prices, the core problem may be the technological structure for how network
selection among available networks in the visited country has been designed.
The network connection switches frequently between available networks, and
the choice of network has largely been independent of wholesale prices. The re-
cent European price-cap regulation (enforced in June 2007) does not solve this
underlying problem, and there may be a permanent need for regulation. This
is analogous to the case of domestic call termination, and should be a caution-
ary tale to the authorities whose goal is that the price cap regulation should
be temporary. Furthermore, there is also a risk that wholesale price regulation
stimualtes wasteful rent-seeking activity, where visited operators excessively in-
crease their network capacity to capture a larger share of the increasing roaming
tra¢ c.
One crucial assumption in the present paper is that the downstream rms
have wholesale agreements with all upstream rms. This may be seen as consis-
tent with the observation that mobile operators generally have roaming agree-
ments with all network operators with signicant coverage in each country. One
reason is that the downstream rms in so doing may improve coverage for their
end-users when travelling abroad. In emerging markets this seems to be relevant.
In mature markets, where several upstream rms have full coverage, this argu-
ment is less appealing. A downstream rm may reduce the number of wholesale
agreements, and thereby undercut its rivals since the average wholesale price is
lowered.
Another rationale for having several agreements in a particular country has
been to increase wholesale demand at home. A high number of wholesale agree-
ments implies more demand from foreign visitors. This is not incorporated in
the basic model above, but may be seen as a justication for the assumption
that the downstream rms have agreements with all the upstream rms even if
this increases the average wholesale price.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1. If wj  w^ for all jf1; :::; ng (nonbinding or exactly
binding), then unconstrained rms will not change their behaviour. Consider
now the case where wj > w^ for at least one rm jf1; :::; ng: Suppose, by
assumption, that the average wholesale price w (in equilibrium) increases. From
16
SNF Working Paper No 05/09
the rst-order condition (9) it follows that wj must be reduced. A reduction
in wj ; however, contradicts the assumption that w increases (recall that the
wholesale prices of rms facing a binding cap are also reduced). The average
wholesale price w must therefore decrease in equilbrium. It follows then from
the rst-order condition that wj will increase
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